1020755; 1020758; 1020763; 1020764; 1020768; 1020773
We find this argument unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, the statutes cited by the Board were enacted separately from § 40-l2--4 (b) / a fact which makes less viable any inference that the various sections of Title 40 can be read in pan matenia to imply a legislative intent to redefine “person” as that term is used in § 40-12-4 (b) . Second, and most importantly, the Board’ argument itself makes clear that the Legislature knew how to separate the terms and, for whatever reason, chose not to do so in § 40-12-4 (b) . In this respect, its argument actually cuts against the Board. In any event, the Board’s argument certainly does not provide a context that would require a construction of the term “person” as used in § 4 0-12-4 (b) other than the one provided by § 4 0-1- 1(8).
Even if the occupational tax was a type of tax that the Commission could levy under § 40-12-4(a), to be valid the occupational tax would have to be “levied uniformly and at the same rate against every [ association, estate, trust, partnership, corporation, or other entity of any kind’] engaged in the pursuit of any business or profession within the county.”